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Note
Taming the Electronic Frontier: Software Copyright
Protection in the Wake of United States v. LaMacchia
Teddy C. Kim*
In 1994 David LaMacchia, a twenty-year-old M.I.T. student,
accessed the Internet and set up an electronic bulletin board'
named Cynosure.2 LaMacchia encouraged Internet users to
upload copies of popular software packages to Cynosure. He
then transferred the software to a second bulletin board called
Cynosure II. LaMacchia permitted users with access to the
Cynosure password to download the copyrighted software onto
their home computers.4 After LaMacchia's scheme resulted in
* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; A.B. 1993,
University of Chicago.
1. An electronic bulletin board service (BBS) is analogous to a corner store.
BBSs are fixed, public sites where Internet users congregate. Most BBSs offer
a standard list of services, such as message postings, electronic mail, discussion
groups, and file libraries. Erik Delfino, The Basics on Setting Up an Electronic
Bulletin Board System, ONLINE, Mar. 1993, at 90. In technical terms, a BBS
is simply a computer system that serves as a repository for electronically
formatted information. The basic configuration of most bulletin boards is a
personal computer running special bulletin board software, connected via
modem to phone lines. Id. BBSs are many and diverse. Conservative
estimates place the number of privately operated BBSs at about 60,000 and
rising. LANCE ROSE, NETLAW 4 (1995); see generally Eric Schlachter,
Cyberspace, the Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas: Recognizing
Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin Board Functions, 16 HASTINGS COmM.
& ENr. L.J. 87 (1993) (describing different types of bulletin boards).
BBS operators (sysops) exercise varying degrees of control over their
bulletin boards' functions. Although some sysops reserve the right to censor
mail and other postings, many limit their activities to file maintenance and
technical support. Delfino, supra at 91. Even under the most restrictive sysops,
however, a BBS's raison d'etre is rooted in its interaction with users.
Ultimately, the demands of connected users dictate the structure and tenor of
online services, as well as of the online community generally. See Schlachter,
supra at 101-04, 107-11 (discussing the market and demand for various online
services).
2. United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 536 (D. Mass. 1994).
3. Id.
4. Id.
1255
1256 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1255
estimated losses of one million dollars to the software copyright
holders,5 A federal grand jury indicted LaMacchia for criminal
copyright infringement.6  At trial, however, LaMacchia's
inexplicable activities posed substantial obstacles for the
prosecution. Because the criminal copyright statute requires a
commercial motive on the part of the infringer, the government
was unable to charge LaMacchia under that law.' Furthermore,
the National Stolen Property Act could not be used in a copy-
right prosecution because the Supreme Court limited application
of that act to the theft of physical things.' In the end, the
government charged LaMacchia only with violating the federal
wire fraud statute.9 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts held the wire fraud statute inapplicable to
copyright infringement, and LaMacchia went free.' °
LaMacchia's acquittal has spurred policy makers to consider
implementing criminal sanctions in the war against online"
5. Id. at 537.
6. Id. at 536.
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
8. See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 220-21 (1985).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994); see LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 537.
10. Superficially, the wire fraud statute seemed appropriate to the facts at
hand. The wire fraud statute does not require a showing that the defendant
sought to profit personally from the prohibited act. 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The
district court nevertheless declined to apply § 1343 to LaMacchia's acts, holding
that nondisclosure can serve as the basis of a scheme to defraud only when
there is a fiduciary relationship between the infringer and the victim.
LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 542. At a broader level, the district court thought
an application of the wire fraud statute to the case would amount to indirect,
and therefore impermissible, enforcement of the copyright laws. Id. at 543.
The court dismissed LaMacchia's indictment and he went free. Id. at 545.
Afterwards, LaMacchia said it was a "relief to know that this remains a country
where the rule of law governs." Charges Dropped Against Student, COMPUTER
FRAUD & SEC. BULL., Feb. 1, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database.
Judge Stearns declared LaMacchia innocent of wire fraud, but he did not
hesitate to denounce LaMacchia's actions:
[Olne might at best describe [LaMacchia's] actions as heedlessly
irresponsible, and at worst as nihilistic, self-indulgent, and lacking in
any fundamental sense of values. Criminal as well as civil penalties
should probably attach to willful, multiple infringements of copyrighted
software even absent a commercial motive on the part of the infringer.
LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 545.
11. "Online" is a descriptive term indicating that a certain activity takes
place in cyberspace, or virtual, computer-generated space. William Gibson
coined the term 'cyberspace" in Neuromancer, his famous 1984 novel. See
WiLLiAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).
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software piracy.12  The stakes of this debate are high: the
advent of online transmission and copying is an unprecedented
technological leap 3 that threatens the logic and integrity of the
copyright laws as applied to software. 4 As a result, there is a
pressing need for a substantive policy determination regarding
intellectual property rights in the online world. 5
12. A central inquiry in this debate is how to bring online pirates within
the ambit of criminal laws. A number of proposals are in the works or on the
table. President Clinton's Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights has
recommended modification of existing criminal rules to address new technolo-
gies. The Working Group has proposed amendment of the Copyright Act to
reflect that copies of works can be distributed to the public by "transmission."
That amendment would bring online pirates unambiguously within the reach
of existing criminal laws. See THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE 121 (1994); cf. Bruce Lehman, Assistant Secretary of
Commerce, Comments on the Release of the Preliminary Draft of the Report of
the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Federal News Service
Washington Package (1995), available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database
(asserting that criminal laws must be available in the digital domain).
Senator Charles Grassley has introduced a bill which would amend the wire
fraud statute to provide criminal sanctions for noncommercial software piracy
on the Internet. See S. 974, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1030(A)(a)(1) (1995) ("It
shall be unlawful to use a computer or computer network to transfer unlicensed
computer software, regardless of whether the transfer is performed for economic
consideration."). Despite lobbying by the online service industry, policy makers
have refused to undertake legislation that would grant bulletin board operators
amnesty from the criminal copyright laws. Jill Gambon, Online Services Say
Copyright Bill Offers Too Little Protection, INFO. WK., Sept. 25, 1995, at 102;
Constance Johnson, Courts Struggle with Definition of Cyberspace, WALL ST. J.,
July 27, 1995, at B1.
13. See M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and
the First Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681, 1687-92 (1995) (discussing the
modern preeminence of digital media); see also Andrew Jenks, Clinton Stumbles
with Intellectual Property Guidelines, WASH. TECH., Dec. 8, 1994, available in
WESTLAW, Allnews Database (distinguishing the bootleg record industry from
software piracy, in that digital information can be perfectly, easily, and quickly
copied).
14. See generally I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for
"Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993 (1994) (questioning whether extant legal
norms and concepts are appropriate in cyberspace); Lawrence Lessig, The Path
of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743 (1995) (arguing that new modes of technology
facilitate new modes of criminal conduct, which existing laws are not equipped
to deal with).
15. In 1992, Robert Kruger, director of enforcement for the Business
Software Alliance's North American program, stated that Internet software
piracy is "probably the most rapidly growing area of piracy, because as more
and more people go on line, the customer base for illegal software grows
exponentially." Barbara Carton, Man Charged in Software Piracy, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 1, 1994, at 41, 52.
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This Note argues that criminal copyright laws are ineffective
in cyberspace, and that a combination of copy protection and
civil actions is best suited for the amelioration of noncommercial
software piracy. Part I traces the historical development of
copyright law and discusses the peculiarities of online culture.
Part II asserts that modern technological advances have
subordinated the print model of authorship, and have therefore
undermined the logic of traditional criminal copyright laws. By
imposing criminal sanctions exclusively on large-scale infringers,
the criminal copyright laws do not acknowledge the threat the
average computer user poses in the digital era. Part III
concludes that software makers should focus on technological
copy protections to deter the average computer user, and reserve
civil actions for large-scale infringers. These tactics will deter
software piracy and are preferable to criminal sanctions as a
means to protect copyright.
I. CYBERSPACE: A LAWLESS FRONTIER
A. EXISTING LEGAL DEVICES Do NOT APPLY TO
NONCOMMERCIAL SOFTwARE PIRACY
The Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause provides
that "Congress shall have the Power... to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."16  Pursuant to this authority,
Congress grants to inventors exclusive monopolies in the form of
copyrights, 7 and enacts legislation designed to protect the
16. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
17. The monopoly privilege Congress grants is not intended to provide
exclusive benefit to private individuals. It is a limited grant, meant to
stimulate artistic creativity so that the general public can benefit from authors'
labors. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429-32 (1984).
Certain members of the software industry impute a narrower purpose to the
country's copyright laws. Diane Smiroldo, director of public affairs for the
Business Software Alliance, asserts: "Software is a thriving business, but could
be even more so if piracy was eradicated." Tim O'Shei, Communication Piracy
Rampant on the Software Seas, Bus. FIRST BUFFALO, July 31, 1995, at 23,
available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database; cf Erik J. Heels & Richard P. Klau,
Online, STUDENT LAw., Oct. 1995, at 35, 36 (maintaining that digital copying
will not dampen creativity because artists have remained profitable by
controlling the distribution of digital works at their source). Contra Casey B.
Mulligan, Pornography, Profits and the Internet, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 1995, § 1,
at 19 (arguing the best way to reduce online pornography is to reduce the
monetary incentive to create pornography by permitting copying on the
1258
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rights of copyright holders.'"
The Intellectual Property Clause grants Congress plenary
authority over copyright; Congress alone may legislate directly
in this area,'9 and courts have deferred to Congress's institu-
tional authority in this field.20 Hence, legal responses to
copyright infringement usually have taken the form of congres-
Internet).
18. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429.
19. Id. Congress has classified certain uses of a copyrighted work as "fair"
uses that do not infringe a copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) ("[Tlhe fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means ... for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching .. ., scholarship, or research is not an
infringement of copyright."). Four nonexclusive factors are considered in
determining whether a particular use is fair: the purpose and character of the
use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount of the portion used in
relation to the entire work, and the effect of the use upon the potential market
for, or value of, the copyrighted work. Id.
Fair use is a limited doctrine, however. When the purpose of copying is to
avoid purchasing an authorized copy, the fair use doctrine may not be invoked.
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 14-16 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). Copying of entertainment works involving fiction and fantasy do not
generally qualify as fair use. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1985). When an infringer copies an entire work, or when
the copied portions are an essential part of the overall work, fair use does not
apply. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
Likewise, copying that effects a substantially adverse impact on the market for,
or value of, a copyrighted work does not qualify as fair use. Cable/Home
Communication. Corp. v. Network Prod., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (11th Cir.
1990). Because the copyright laws give owners control over all activities of
commercial value, commercial uses of a copyrighted work are not typically fair
uses. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (noting that "every commercial use
of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright").
The Copyright Act does not expressly address contributory infringement.
Nevertheless, federal courts have held that a person who knowingly causes,
induces, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another may be
held liable as a contributory infringer. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55,
62-63 (1911). Specific or particularized knowledge of infringing activity is not
essential to contributory infringement. Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365
(11th Cir. 1987). A person who has a role in copying, or who provides facilities,
directions, knowledge, or encouragement will be liable as a contributory
infringer. Id.
20. See generally Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 431 ("Sound policy, as well as
history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological
innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials."); Deepsouth Packing
Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972) ("The direction of Art. I is that
Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts.... [Tihe sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only from
Congress.").
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sional enactments.2'
1. The Scope of Title 17
Title 17 of the United States Code contains both civil and
criminal enforcement mechanisms. Criminal copyright laws,
however, apply only to large-scale infringers. The criminal
copyright infringement statute, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a), prohibits the
willful or commercial reproduction or distribution often or more
copies of a copyrighted work with a retail value of more than
$2500.22 As currently written, this section applies only when
an infringer has a commercial motive.23
21. Copyright laws have struggled to keep pace with technology. The
tremendous growth of the record industry in the 1960s occurred concurrently
with significant advances in home recording technology. The resulting
proliferation of bootlegged records caused financial concerns for legitimate
record distributors. Congress responded with the Sound Recording Act of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.), which provided criminal penalties for profit-motivated infringement
of copyrighted recordings. See H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971),
reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567 (discussing the need to address the
bootleg record problem).
In the 1980s, the advent of home video recording technology allowed home
viewers to duplicate copyrighted programs easily and efficiently. Concerns
about infringement led the movie industry to lobby for higher penalties on
copyright infringement. Ever solicitous, Congress increased penalties for
criminal infringement in 1982. Act of May 24, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96
Stat. 91 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318, 2319 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
Copyright protection for software dates back to 1980. In that year,
Congress added computer programs to the list of works protected by the
copyright laws. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining a computer program as "a
set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer
in order to bring about a certain result"). In recent years, the computer
software industry has lobbied for increased copyright protection. Senator Orrin
Hatch, the Senate sponsor of the Copyright Felony Act, asserted that the
"willful infringement of copyright in computer software programs is a wide-
spread practice that is threatening the U.S. software industry." 138 CONG. REC.
S7580 (daily ed. June 4, 1992). Hatch assured the Senate that enhanced
criminal penalties would deter large-scale infringement of software copyrights.
Id.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
23. Id. The mens rea for criminal infringement was a matter of some
concern within Congress. During consideration of the statute in the House,
Representative Hughes said of S. 893:
The bill we take up today contains important safeguards to ensure that
isolated but unauthorized copying, and ordinary business disputes are
not subject to felony penalties. One of those safeguards is a stringent
mens rea requirement. No criminal liability may be imposed unless
the conduct was done willfully and for purpose of commercial advan-
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Unlike criminal copyright laws, civil copyright laws encom-
pass noncommercial infringement. Civil infringement occurs
whenever a person infringes on a copyright holder's rights,
regardless of the infringer's state of mind.24 A copyright holder
may bring a civil action in a federal district court for damages
incurred from the infringement.25 To establish a prima facie
case of copyright infringement, a plaintiff need only show
ownership of the copyright and copying by the defendant."
2. The Scope of the Stolen Property Act
The government has attempted to prosecute copyright
infringement under the Stolen Property Act, which prohibits the
interstate transportation of stolen or fraudulently obtained
property" In United States v. Dowling,2" prosecutors used
this language to prosecute interstate transportation of boot-
legged phonograph records.29 The Supreme Court, however,
tage or private financial gain.
138 CONG. REC. H11,130 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992). Senator Hatch specified that
to invoke criminal sanctions, "the copying must be undertaken to make money."
138 CONG. REC. S17,959 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992). Since 1897 the concept of
criminal infringement in U.S. copyright law has hinged on the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial motivations. See Act of Jan. 6, 1897,
ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481, 481-82 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994). Only two online piracy cases have been
reported in the civil realm. In Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552
(M.D. Fla. 1993), the defendant operated Tech's Warehouse, a Georgia-based
BBS. Frena posted digital images of copyrighted Playboy photographs on his
bulletin board. For a fee, Frena permitted subscribers to download copyrighted
images onto their home computers. Frena was motivated by profit and
therefore could have been prosecuted under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a). Nevertheless,
Playboy decided to pursue civil remedies. At trial, the district court held that
copyrights are not lost in the online world, and held Frena liable for copyright
infringement. Playboy Enters., 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
In Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHA, the defendant was a California-based BBS
that trafficked in pirated video game software. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal.
1994). Like LaMacchia, MAPHIA's sysop encouraged users to upload copies of
popular video games. Id. at 681-83. MAPHIA sold its users machines
necessary to play the games on home consoles and charged users downloading
fees. Id. at 684-85. Sega pursued civil remedies under 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994).
Id. at 687-88. At trial, MAPHIA's attorneys argued against liability by assert-
ing that its activities were exempt under the fair use doctrine. Id. The district
court summarily rejected this argument and upheld the seizure of MAPHIA's
online system under the copyright laws. Id. at 690.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 1009(b) (1994).
26. Id. § 501(a).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994).
28. 739 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
29. Id. at 1447.
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overturned Dowling's conviction, holding that the Stolen
Property Act protects only physical goods or merchandise."
The Court distinguished copyright from other forms of property
as a carefully circumscribed bundle of rights that requires exact
protections."' Because of this distinction, fraud, theft, and
conversion of physical goods are not analogous to appropriation
of statutorily protected rights in copyright. 2 The Court con-
cluded that copyright-related crime may not be prosecuted under
statutes Congress does not specifically intend to protect copy-
right.3
3
3. The Scope of the Wire Fraud Statute
Despite the Supreme Court's warning in Dowling v. United
States, prosecutors attempted to apply the federal wire fraud
statute to software copyright infringement in United States v.
LaMacchia.34 To sustain a conviction under this statute, the
government must prove a scheme to defraud or to obtain money
or property by fraudulent pretense, and defendant's use of wire
communications in furtherance of that scheme. 5 Like the civil
copyright statute, the wire fraud statute does not require an
infringer to have a profit motive.36
Because of its low mens rea requirement, the wire fraud
statute seemed suited to cases of noncommercial software
piracy. 7 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court established in
Dowling that the government may not prosecute copyright
infringement under statutes Congress does not specifically
30. See generally Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) (discussing
the proper scope of the Stolen Property Act).
31. Id. at 216.
32. Id.
33. Justice Blackmun wrote, "Congress always has had the bestowed
authority to legislate directly in this area. ... Given that power, it is
implausible to suppose that Congress intended to combat the problem of
copyright infringement by the circuitous route hypothesized by the government."
Id. at 220-21.
34. See generally United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass.
1994) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss a grand jury indictment for wire
fraud).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994).
36. Id.
37. As long as the jurisdictional element is met, an act that can be
prosecuted under the mail fraud statute is equally susceptible to punishment
under § 1343. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).
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intend to apply to copyright infringement.3' Relying heavily on
Dowling, the LaMacchia court held the wire fraud statute
inapplicable to copyright infringement.39
B. SOFTWARE PIRACY IN THE ELECTRONIC DIMENSION
1. A Condensed History of Cyberspace
The modern cyberspace phenomenon began in the 1960s
with Arpanet, an experimental communications network devised
to provide uninterrupted communication between strategically
important sites in the event of a nuclear war." The network,
now known as the Internet, grew from four sites in 1969 to over
two million host computers as of January 1994."' Primitive
communications and computer technology made online access
difficult for all but the most computer-literate and prevented the
Internet's entry into mainstream society for nearly two de-
cades. 2
Technological advances in the 1980s democratized the
Internet by making online communications cheap, simple, and
efficient.4 3 As ease of access increased, the online community
increased in numbers and diversity. Today, roughly six million
38. See generally United States v. Dowling, 473 U.S. 207, 220-21 (1985)
(maintaining that copyrights require exact protections).
39. Compare United States v. Riggs, 743 F. Supp. 556, 562 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(dismissing motion to dismiss a wire fraud indictment of a defendant bulletin
board operator who raided Bell South Telephone Company's E911 file) with
United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 543 (D. Mass. 1994) (distin-
guishing Riggs by concluding that proprietary business information is not
analogous to the bundle of rights held by the owner of a copyright).
40. Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers:
Controlling Behavior in Cyberspace Through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35
JUPmmTRIcS J. 1, 2 (1994).
41. Id.
42. See Margorie Lambert, Information Highway Patrol Pirates, Peeping
Toms and Bandits Are Just a Few of the Criminals Who Lurk on the Internet,
SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May 28, 1995, at IG (observing that in 1993,
the Internet was an elite institution occupied mostly by scientists, educators,
and government workers, compared to its widespread use today).
43. See generally ROSE, supra note 1, atxv (1995) (noting that use of online
systems is getting easier and cheaper every day). Such increased access to the
Internet could not have occurred without the simultaneous technological
advancement in computer hardware, making powerful, affordable computers
available to average individuals. STUART R. WOLK & WILLIAM J. LUDDY, JR.,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF COMPUTER USE ix-xii (1986) (describing how the computer
industry has expanded to accommodate personal computers to the needs of non-
specialists, resulting in mass market growth).
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U.S. adults are connected directly to the Internet; an additional
four million use the Internet through commercial online
services." Worldwide, an estimated forty million adults are
connected to the Internet.45
The conventions and mores which predominate in
cyberspace are markedly different from those that prevail in
"land-based" society. Many Internet users have discarded
traditional models of law, morality, and society. So-called
"netizens" consider themselves to be, and act as though they are,
unfettered by the authority of land-based government."
Intellectual property law, in particular, is anathema to much of
the online community. Some netizens argue that computer
programs consist of metaphysical, mathematical information
and, as such, cannot be protected by copyright.47 Proponents
of this theory strenuously oppose the idea that payment ought
to be rendered in exchange for digitized information. 8 Many
44. Carol Stevens, Evolution of the Internet: As Computer Users Worldwide
Get Sucked into Cyberspace, Experts Ponder the Intellectual, Social and Lifestyle
Effects, DET. NEWS, Oct. 1, 1995, at 11A.
45. Steven S. Ross, Public Relations in Cyberspace, PUB. REL. J., May 1,
1995, at 36.
46. See generally ROSE, supra note 1, at xvii (1995) (distinguishing between
"land-based" laws and government, and cyberlaws); Anne Wells Branscomb,
Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment
in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1652 (1995) (distinguishing between
"geopolitical jurisdictions" and a "cybercommunity"). Both writers make the
same implication: cyberspace is a realm separate and distinct from the physical,
"land-based" world.
47. See Simson L. Garfinkel, How Could the Patent Office Ever Grant a
Patent to Compton's on Its Claim to Have Invented Multimedia?, WIRED, July
1994, at 105, 105-06 (arguing that because software consists of algorithms,
"[wihat may seem like a trivial hack to a gifted programmer may already be a
patented routine"); Michael J. Miller, Software Patents Must Go, PC MAG., Mar.
15, 1994, at 79 (criticizing the idea that software using algorithms should be
protected with proprietary rights); cf Lehman, supra note 12 (insisting that
transmission of software through the Internet is equivalent to distributing a
physical copy of it).
48. See P.J. Hufstetter, Music Wants to Be Free on the Cyberspace Frontier,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., May 14,1995, at El, available in WESTLAW, Allnews
Database (asserting that many users do not care about the legality of accessing
songs from the Internet because of a belief that information ought to be free);
Judy Rakowsky, MIT StudentIs Called Software Piracy Plotter, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 8, 1994, at 1, 30 (noting prosecutors' belief that many pirates are not
motivated by greed, but by a philosophical view that software should be free to
all); cf Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Nabbing the Pirates of Cyberspace, TIME, June 13,
1994, at 62, 62-64 (quoting comments of Michael Godwin, staff counsel for the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, that society is entering a post-copyright era, in
which creators of intellectual property have to find new avenues of compensa-
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netizens exhibit similar legal and societal views because of their
often related backgrounds,49 and share a generalized antipathy
toward corporate America ° and the federal government.5
tion for their work).
What is remarkable about the contemporary debate over online conduct is
the relative rarity with which software piracy is morally condemned. Some
cyberspace observers suggest that conventional criminal laws do not apply to
software piracy because the laws simply do not comport with modern
technological realities. See, e.g., Ronald Rosenberg, Technology Tests Limits of
Law in Computer Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 1994, at 1. Nevertheless,
cyberspace is not an ethical vacuum. In the electronic dimension, the "hacker
ethic" prevails. According to this code, access to computer information should
be democratic, unlimited, and total. See Ken Wong, Fighting Mobile Phone
Fraud, COMPUTER FRAUD & SEC. BULL., Feb. 1, 1995, available in WESTLAW,
Allnews Database (advising system managers that hackers do not feel ethically
restrained from copying or damaging files). Predictably, those who argue
loudest for morality on the Internet are usually representatives of the software
industry. The Software Publishers Association, for example, has published a
code of ethics for software users. Lambert, supra note 42, at 1G.
49. See Dana Blankenhorn, What's Wrong with Bulletin Boards, Newsbytes
News Network, Aug. 19, 1994, available in WESTLAW, Alinews Database
(describing the vast majority of sysops as "white men of a particular stripe: 35-
50, pale, most wearing T-shirts, and socially challenged"); Diva, Netiquette,
WIRED, Jan. 1995, at 150 ("The Net is much like the Wild West of old: male-
dominated, violent, untamed, and desperately in need of domestication.");
Stevens, supra note 44, at A (describing a resolution endorsed by 100
telecommunications experts predicting that the Internet will isolate women be-
cause online culture is so male-dominated).
50. Anti-commercial sentiment is an important characteristic of online
society. When Unisys and CompuServe agreed to a royalty scheme for use of
Unisys's compression technology, which is widely used for transferring images
over the Internet, angry users barraged the Internet with complaints that
Unisys was trying to claim revenue from a technology that was not rightfully
its own. Angela Gunn, Law and Disorder on the Internet, PC MAG., Mar. 14,
1995, at 30; cf Jenks, supra note 13 (asserting that the Clinton administration's
proposals for Internet regulation rewards wealthy business concerns at the
expense of average Net users).
Net users do not need prompting from big business and government-anti-
commercial sentiment is an everyday feature of cyberculture. See Judith
Gaines, Students Ponder Software Piracy, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 1994, at 1, 4
(detailing the negative attitudes of several MIT and Harvard students towards
commercial software concerns); Hufstetter, supra note 48, at El (discussing
Internet users' feeling that downloads of copyrighted music should be free);
Charles A. Radin, Info Highway Robbery Software Piracy Siphons Off Billions,
but Gives Many Treasured Access to Digital Revolution, FT. WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Mar. 5, 1995, at 9, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database
(reporting that many Internet users resent the possessiveness of the major
software companies).
51. Anti-government sentiment runs through much of the discourse in
cyberspace. See Rob Glaser, Universal Service Does Matter, WIRED, Jan. 1995,
at 96 ("[T]he idea of universal service... is inextricably linked to an archaic,
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2. Modem Technology Thwarts Law Enforcement in
Cyberspace
Cyberspace is more than a communications network; it is a
computer-generated environment, vastly different from the
physical world with which we are familiar. The realities that
inhere with a computer-generated environment pose grave
challenges for law enforcement efforts. The most serious
barriers to effective police efforts in cyberspace are hyperefficient
digital copying and online anonymity.
Online anonymity is partially a function of the number of
entry points into cyberspace. Because of the Internet's global
breadth, and the ease with which it is navigated, a perpetrator
can be very remote from the actual "crime scene." 2 If investi-
centralized, paternalistic, and discredited approach to government."); Bruce
Sterling, So, People, We Have a Fight on Our Hands, WIRED, July 1994, at 71,
72 (lambasting FBI proposals for digital telephony, and NSA proposals of an
encrypted network as totalitarian measures); Carol Stevens, supra note 44, at
A (asserting that Internet users oppose government regulation of cyberspace);
alt.politics.datahighway (ongoing discussions of media and government action
relating to the Internet).
Net discourse is, however, marked by a peculiar hypocrisy. Despite strong
anti-government sentiment, net users routinely use the First Amendment to
defend their actions. See Peter H. Lewis, Student Accused of Running Network
for Pirated Software, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1994, at Al, A9 (describing assertion
by LaMacchia's attorney that sysops should not be liable for everything that
occurs on their BBSs, since the First Amendment relieves bookstore owners of
liability for the writings on their shelves); Netiquette, WIRED, Apr. 1995, at 162
("The Net is blessed with an attitude of free exchange--of information, of
opinion, of insults.").
52. Bruce Fancher, CEO of Phantom Access Technologies Inc., explains that
the number of entry points make efforts at tracking users virtually impossible.
Lewis, supra note 51, at A9. Anyone with a computer and modem can interface
with a similarly equipped computer on the other side of the globe.
As a general matter, the concept of "Net security" is a contradiction in
terms. See Ross, supra note 45, at 37 (noting the shortcomings of technical
anti-piracy measures); Dwight R. Worley, The Hard Drive Analog Laws Can't
Keep Up With Digital Technology Copyrights Offer Little Protection in Computer
Age, NEWSDAY, Apr. 30, 1995 at 2, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database
(same); ef Wong, supra note 48 (discussing the concern among network security
managers that the Internet itself is being used to disseminate detailed
information about phone fraud).
Not even divine retribution can keep people off the Net. At Brigham Young
University, students are expressly forbidden from downloading pornography.
Nevertheless, incidents of students accessing pornography on the Internet are
on the rise. Joan O'Brien, Still More BYU Students Surfing Net for Porn, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Aug. 22, 1995, at B1, available in WESTLAW, SLTR file.
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gators do not know where a particular transmission came from,
the odds of discovering who is responsible for the transmission
are extremely low. The increased use of pooled computer
facilities in universities and offices has compounded the problem
by multiplying the number of entry points into cyberspace."
With pooled systems, investigators can use audit trails to track
a transmission to a particular computer station.54 Investigators
cannot trace a message to a particular individual, however,
unless they know which person used a particular computer.55
Pooled computer systems are largely unsupervised, making it
impossible for investigators to identify infringers."
The modern proliferation of anonymous remailers"7 exacer-
bates this problem by providing highly discrete points of entry
into cyberspace. 5 Net users who wish to avoid scrutiny can
simply route their transmissions through a series of
remailers.59 Use of anonymous remailers renders audit trails
useless and makes it impossible to match a transmission to a
60particular user.
Remailers are a common, but not exclusive, factor in online
anonymity. 1 Even the most technically challenged computer
user can adopt a pseudonym. A user needs only a little more
expertise to encrypt communications using programs available
at most computer software stores. Skilled users have hacked
phone records and Internet accounts and used that information
to assume another person's electronic identity. 2 Computer
53. Branscomb, supra note 46, at 1643 n.11.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. (explaining that anonymous remailers provide a guarantee that
messages cannot be traced back to their sources).
58. Id.
59. The Church of Scientology unleashed a flood of litigation against
Internet users who posted secret church literature in public Internet sites. One
poster, whose online name is Scamizdat, has eluded efforts at detection by
routing his transmissions through a series of remailers. Wendy M. Grossman,
alt.scientology.war, WIRED, Dec. 1995, at 172, 252.
60. Steven Levy, How to Launder Your E-Mail, WIRED, June 1994, at 50,
50-51.
61. See Lambert, supra note 42, at 1G (discussing the ease with which
users maintain anonymity on the Internet); Ross, supra note 45, at 36, 37
(asserting that users can adopt aliases, subscribe under assumed names, hack
other people's accounts, or fake a biography in a system's directory).
62. One system administrator at Polytechnic University of New York noted
the ease with which hackers can invade an individual's Internet account and
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users of any skill level can obtain anonymity and break laws
with impunity.
63
The advent of hyperefficient digital copying enhances the
computer user's capacity for mischief. Computer programs are
different from other media because they consist of digitally
encoded information. Unlike books or phonograph records, a
computer program's existence does not require physicality. This
is significant because physically bound media are difficult to
copy. A bootlegged book, for instance, would require hours of
labor-intensive printing or photocopying, and the finished
product would be far from perfect. As any computer owner
knows, computer programs are extremely easy to reproduce.
The act of downloading is reproduction, and no quality is lost in
the process.' Modern communications technology allows
Internet users to download vast quantities of perfect software
quickly, easily, and without risk.65
3. Online Software Piracy: What It Is and How It Works
Most cases of software piracy using BBSs involve two
distinct parties. The first party is the system operator (sysop)
who is analogous to a shopkeeper. The sysop operates the
bulletin board and manages its functions.66 The second party
is the enduser, an individual computer user who is analogous to
a customer. In a typical case of online software piracy, an
enduser will connect with a bulletin board via modem, and
upload software packages from a home computer onto the
bulletin board. Other endusers can then download the software
from the bulletin board onto their home computers."
assume that individual's online identity. The system administrator commented
that "[this kind of thing is happening all the time these days," and concluded
that "[it's getting to be a real nuisance." See Joshua Quittner, Automata Non
Grata, WIRED, Apr. 1995, at 119, 120-21.
63. See Lessig, supra note 14, at 1750 (asserting that online anonymity
invites crime).
64. Digitization converts works into digital code (a series of zeros and ones).
Digitally encoded works can be stored and used in that format. Digitalization
greatly increases the ease and speed with which works can be reproduced, and
the quality of the resulting copies.
65. See Jenks, supra note 13 (distinguishing the bootleg record industry
from software piracy).
66. Schlachter, supra note 1, at 90.
67. The three litigated cases of online software piracy have all followed this
pattern. See United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994);
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Playboy
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Theoretically, prosecutors could apply the criminal copyright
statute to an enduser.6' For practical reasons, however, the
party most susceptible to law enforcement efforts is the sysop.
69
Bulletin boards are highly visible, public sites where large
numbers of net users congregate.7" This visibility makes sysops
more vulnerable to law enforcement than endusers, who are
many and diffuse.7 Current law enforcement efforts reflect the
fact that sysops are easier to catch and prosecute than
endusers.72 In fact, the three published cases of online software
Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
68. It is hard to imagine a reason why an enduser would download ten
copies of the same software, as is required for prosecution under 17 U.S.C.
§ 506(a) (1994). In fact, § 506 is targeted specifically at "large-scale" copyright
pirates. 138 CONG. REC. H11,130 (Oct. 3, 1992) (statement of Congressman
Hughes, noting that the ten copy minimum would remove "isolated but
unauthorized copying" from criminal liability). This policy, if not completely
wrongheaded, is certainly illogical. Endusers upload and download software
and, as such, are at least as culpable as sysops.
69. The liability of sysops has been a conspicuous point of contention. For
a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see generally Kelly Tickle, Vicarious
Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators for the Copyright Infringement
Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards, 80 IOWA L. REV. 391 (1995). Some
cyberspace observers argue sysops are analogous to newspaper editors, who are
not liable for the content of their publications. Lewis, supra note 51, at A9; cf
Jeff Rose, Software Piracy Cases in News Are Off Course, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Apr. 12, 1994, at 3, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database
(discussing whether BBSs are just conduits, like telephone companies).
70. High levels of online traffic are a sure tipoff to law enforcement
agencies. Both university and federal authorities noticed that LaMacchia's
bulletin board was attracting heavy traffic, leading to LaMacchia's eventual
indictment. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 536.
71. Sysops are particularly vulnerable for the simple reason that they are
fewer in number than the millions of endusers who dial into bulletin boards.
Law enforcement efforts are simplified greatly by granting amnesty to the
hundreds or thousands of endusers wired into any given bulletin board.
72. Although there is no settled jurisprudence in this area, software pirates
continue to be arrested. On August 31, 1994, authorities arrested Richard
Kenadek, sysop of a Massachusetts BBS called "Davy Jones' Locker," and
charged him with conspiracy and criminal copyright infringement. Barbara
Carton, Man Charged in Software Piracy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1, 1994, at 41.
Kenadek was nabbed when the Software Publishers Association downloaded
copyrighted programs from the bulletin board and presented the evidence to
prosecutors. Joseph C. Panettieri, Feds Charge Piracy, INFO. WK., Oct. 10,
1994, at 16.
In April 1994, authorities arrested sysop Daniel Goldwater, a student at
Brown University, for online software piracy. Rose, supra note 69, at 3. Like
LaMacchia, Goldwater did not charge downloading fees for software-but he did
allow software to remain on his bulletin board once someone else had put it
there. Id.
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piracy named only the sysop as a defendant."
4. The Effects of Online Software Piracy
Copyright infringement exacts a heavy toll. Software
makers lose at least $1.6 billion a year through domestic
software piracy alone.74 When overseas markets are included,
that figure swells to $9.1 billion, 5 although some estimates run
as high as $15.2 billion.76 The European market accounts for
39% of the world-wide dollar losses resulting from software
piracy, followed by Asia at 29% and the United States and
Canada at 21%.7 In China, 98% of the software in use is
pirated;"8 in Bulgaria, the figure is 95%.
79
Although exact figures are unavailable, a substantial
proportion of software piracy does occur on the Internet.80 The
Software Publishers Association (SPA) has called the Internet a
"breeding ground for software piracy,"81 and it has begun to
conduct surveillance of suspect bulletin boards.82
Although the software business is thriving, the losses
incurred from software piracy have reduced the number of
In August 1995, Novell, a software maker, filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Utah, against Joseph Casalino IIl, alleging that the
eighteen-year-old sysop had distributed copyrighted software over a BBS called
Planet Gallifrey. Novell Shoots Planet BBS Out of the Sky, Newsbytes News
Network, Aug. 15, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database. On April
19, 1995, U.S. Marshals and investigators from Microsoft Corp. and Novell
raided the Lexington Kentucky headquarters of the Assassin's Guild, believed
to be the headquarters of two pirate groups known as "Pirates With an
Attitude" and "Razor 1911." U.S. Marshals Raid Alleged Pirate BBS,
Newsbytes News Network, Apr. 28, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnews
Database. Authorities conducted a similar raid on a Minneapolis-based BBS
called "Cloud 9." Id. An industry representative stated that the companies
intended the raids to "send a message to the pirate BBS community." Id.
73. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (citing the three published
cases of online software piracy).
74. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 48.
75. Id.
76. Tim O'Shei, Communications Piracy Rampant on the Software Seas,
Bus. FIRST BUFFALO, July 31, 1995, at 23.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. SPA Reveals Increase in Cybercrime, COMPUTER FRAUD & SEC. BULL.,
Feb. 1, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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dollars dedicated to product research and development.83
Furthermore, losses from piracy affect legitimate purchasers by
contributing to the inflation of retail software prices.84 As
losses mount, lawmakers will need to reevaluate the copyright
laws as applied to software.
II. PAPER TIGERS IN THE ELECTRONIC DIMENSION
A. CRIMINAL LIABILITY WILL NOT DECREASE ONLINE
SOFTWARE PIRACY
The utility of legal remedies is dubious in the context of
online software piracy. The legal academy is loathe to acknowl-
edge the limitations of the law, but the rapid and dramatic
changes accompanying new technologies caution against ivory
tower legislation. Lawmakers should seek a precise understand-
ing of cyberspace before they make regulatory forays into the
electronic dimension.
Primarily, lawmakers need to accept the limitations of law
enforcement in cyberspace. Because sysops are highly visible
and accessible, they are an easy target for law enforcement.
Nevertheless, sysops are only one element of the piracy equation.
Absent a realistic means of enforcement against endusers, legal
remedies, criminal or civil, cannot and will not decrease the
amount of illegal copying in cyberspace.
1. Enduser Complicity and Enforcement of the Laws
Software piracy is a direct result of endusers' demand for
illegal copies. Furthermore, endusers are responsible for much,
if not all, of the illegal copying occurring in cyberspace. In U.S.
v. LaMacchia, for example, Cynosure's endusers performed all of
the illegal copying. 5 Copyright holders' losses from Cynosure
were commensurate with endusers' demand for illegal copies. 6
83. See O'Shei, supra note 76, at 23 (quoting a Business Software Alliance
representative).
84. Id.
85. District Judge Stearns went to great lengths to criticize David
LaMacchia's moral fiber. In contrast, Stearns portrayed endusers as compliant
victims who should not face criminal liability because they "succumb to the
temptation to copy even a single software program for private use." United
States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 544 (D. Mass. 1994); cf supra text
accompanying notes 66-72 (discussing the problem of enduser complicity).
86. Sysops do not force copies on endusers as Judge Stearns intimates. See
LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 544 (characterizing Cynosure's endusers as
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Nevertheless, Cynosure's endusers were not named as defen-
dants.
Despite their complicity in illegal copying, endusers enjoy an
immunity created by the language of section 506. The criminal
copyright statute is limited, by design, to large-scale infring-
ers.17 By requiring that an infringer make ten or more copies
of a copyrighted work, the criminal copyright statute itself
essentially precludes enduser liability.88
Theoretically, law makers could impose criminal liability on
endusers by providing sanctions where only one copy of the same
work is made, or by lowering the mens rea for criminal infringe-
ment to include noncommercial motivations.89 An amendment
of that nature would implicate tens of millions of computer
users, but it would not provide any realistic means of detecting
or apprehending them."
Fundamentally, policy makers must accept the limitations
of law enforcement in the cyberspace context. Legal remedies,
criminal or civil, are useless where there is no accountability. In
cyberspace, legal remedies will only operate meaningfully
against those parties whom law enforcement agencies can
catch-sysops.
2. Punishing Sysops Will Not Decrease the Gross Incidence of
Illegal Copying
Should criminal liability continue to be imposed exclusively
upon sysops, the number of large, domestically operated pirate
compliant victims). Endusers make illegal copies because they are unwilling to
pay retail prices for software.
87. 138 CONG. REC. H11,130 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Hughes) (noting that the ten copy minimum would remove "isolated but
unauthorized copying" from criminal liability).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
89. Senator Grassley has introduced a bill which would amend the wire
fraud statute to provide criminal sanctions for noncommercial software piracy
on the Internet. See S. 974, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1030(A)(a)(1) (1995). This
bill appears to be "narrowly tailored" to put people like David LaMacchia behind
bars. Absent a realistic means of enforcement against endusers, however, an
amendment like S. 974 will not materially reduce the gross incidence of illegal
copying.
90. See supra part I.B.2. (discussing the problems faced by law enforcement
in cyberspace). Lowering the mens rea for criminal infringement would make
the criminal copyright statute virtually identical to the civil copyright statute,
which has done little to prevent enduser copying. The prospect of imprisonment
is certainly more daunting than pecuniary loss. Nevertheless, criminal laws
have little deterrent effect where there is no threat of enforcement.
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boards on the Internet might decrease.9 Nevertheless, punish-
ing sysops will not reduce the amount of illegal copying because
domestic pirate boards are only one source of illegal copies.
Endusers who want illegal copies can obtain them over the
Internet through easily accessed, international pirate boards92
or through user-to-user transmissions.93  In the physical
dimension, individual users and corporations can pirate software
by copying other people's disks.94 Even the most technically
challenged can download the contents of a floppy disk onto a
home computer, which possibly accounts for the frequency of
that occurrence.95 Because there are many sources for illegal
91. See 138 CONG. REC. S7580 (June 4, 1992) (Statement of Sen. Hatch)
(asserting that criminal liability will decrease "the large-scale, commercially-
oriented copying of programs"). Some sysops might seek to protect their boards
with encryption and other anti-detection measures, and continue to traffic in
illegal software. Most, however, probably will follow George Frena's lead and
remove illegal materials from their bulletin boards. See Playboy Enters., Inc.
v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (discussing Frena's removal
of illegal materials from his board once he was apprised of the risk of
apprehension).
92. Cyberspace is a global network that is meant to facilitate long-distance
communications. It is no harder to interface with a computer in Bangkok than
with a computer owned by your next door neighbor. LaMacchia's endusers, for
example, routed their transmissions through an Internet address located in
Finland that promised anonymous file transfers. Ronald Rosenberg, Technology
Tests Limits of Law in Computer Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 1994, at 4.
93. See Rex S. Heinke & Heather D. Rafter, Rough Justice in Cyberspace:
Liability on the Electronic Frontier, COMPUTER LAW., July 1994, at 1, available
in WESTLAW, JLR Database. CompuServe offered its subscribers access to
digital copies of a song titled "Unchained Melody." Frank Music, the owner of
the song, sued CompuServe. Heinke and Rafter point out that endusers could
anonymously transmit song materials over the Internet without any involve-
ment from Compuserve. Id.
94. Corporate copying is thought to pose graver risks than online piracy.
Greg Short, Note, Combating Software Piracy: Can Felony Penalties for
Copyright Infringement Curtail the Copying of Computer Software?, 10 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 221, 222 (1994); see Norm Alster, Copy
Cops, PC WV., Apr. 17, 1995, at El, El0 (discussing the prevalence of corporate
software piracy); Ted Sherman, A Byte Out of Crime: Cybercop Gets Jersey Firm
on Right Side of Software Laws, STAR-LEDGER, Jan. 20, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, Allnews Database (discussing the Business Software Alliance's
efforts to crack down on corporate infringers).
95. Hackers present a serious threat to the software and communications
industries, but they are only one source of piracy. Not everyone may do their
pirating on the Internet; but, as Peter Beruk, litigation manager for SPA says,
"everybody's done it. ... If someone buys a new personal computer, the
neighbor down the street may come over with a few programs.... Most people
know it's not right but figure that copying one program won't make a huge
difference." O'Shei, supra note 76, at 23.
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copies, and because there is virtually no risk of liability for
endusers, imposing criminal liabilities on sysops will merely
shift the locus of illegal copying without decreasing its inci-
dence.96
Furthermore, shifting the locus of software piracy away from
cyberspace will not aid law enforcement in identifying and
apprehending infringers. Software piracy was a billion dollar
problem for years before the Internet came into common
usage.97 Criminal liabilities did not deter land-based piracy in
the years before the cyberspace phenomenon, and there is no
reason to suppose that it can do so now. Absent a realistic,
efficient means of enforcement against endusers, criminal
liability cannot and will not decrease the amount of illegal
copying in cyberspace or in the land-based dimension.
III. A BRAVE NEW WORLD: A NEW ROLE FOR
COPYRIGHT IN THE MODERN AGE
A. The New "Digitality"
Copyright was born of the technological and social upheaval
occasioned by the printing press.9" Print technology enabled
the large-scale reproduction of individual manuscripts and
therefore inflated the economic value of authorship.99 Copy-
right law arose as a means of ensuring that authors would
receive the monetary benefits made possible by Gutenberg's
revolutionary printing process. °0
96. See Lehman, supra note 12 (explaining that there is no practical way
to prevent small-scale software copying among friends, family, and acquaintanc-
es).
97. Software piracy is not an outgrowth of the Internet; it is an outgrowth
of the personal computer revolution. In the 1980s, corporate and personal
ownership and use of microcomputers increased dramatically just as generic
software was made available from retail and wholesale outlets. Short, supra
note 94, at 223. Because modem software requires little or no support, users
did not form relationships with manufacturers, and did not hesitate to make
illegal copies. Id.
Losses from infringement prompted a series of industry meetings sponsored
by the World Intellectual Property Organization as early as 1974; the National
Commission on the New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works sponsored a
similar dialogue in 1976. LAURA N. GASAWAY & MAUREEN MURPHY, LEGAL
PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS ix (1980).
98. M. ETHAN KATSCH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF LAW 172 (1989).
99. Id. at 173.
100. Id. at 174.
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Centuries later, copyright law is still grounded on the print
model of authorship,'' despite the modem preeminence of
digital technologies. 2  As applied to software, the principal
failing of the print model is it presumes the existence of
physically bound media. This presumption is significant because
the physicality of a medium is, in itself, a deterrent to copying.
To make bootlegged phonograph records, for example, requires
money, machinery, and a substantial labor investment. 10 3
Print-oriented copyright laws do not reflect the paradigmatic
shift that occurred with the advent of personal computing. New
technologies have allayed the physical restraints inherent to the
print model and have substituted the unfamiliar terrain of
digital authorship.' As a practical result, in the digital
regime, the average person can make perfect copies of digitally-
encoded works quickly, easily, and without risk.'°5 Unautho-
rized copying is no longer a rare, sporadic, and furtive occur-
rence. 10 6  Modern technology has given the entire online
population the motive, means, and opportunity to reproduce
copyrighted works.
B. THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE NEW DIGITAL REGIME
In the modern age, new methods of copying, producing, and
101. Title 17 defines "copies" as "material objects ... in which a work is
fixed." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). This definition is too narrow to be of utility in
the digital context. If a user downloads a program from a bulletin board onto
his computer, at what point does the program become a fixed, material object?
When it is installed onto the user's hard drive? Does that mean the hard drive
is a "copy"? Or is the entire computer a "copy"?
102. See Katsch, supra note 13, at 1687-92 (discussing the preeminence of
electronic media).
103. See Criminal Sanctions for Violation of Software Copyright, 1992:
Hearings on S. 893 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial
Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 27
(1992) (statement of Gail Penner on behalf of the Software Publisher's
Association) ("Whereas reproduction of a good book requires a printing plant
and bindery ... all that is required to make perfect copies of a computer
program within a few seconds is a standard personal computer.").
104. See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 214 (1983) ("To
read a copyright text is no violation, only to copy it in writing. The technologi-
cal basis for this distinction is reversed with a computer text. To read a text
stored in electronic memory, one displays it on the screen; one writes it to read
it.").
105. See supra text accompanying notes 65, 103 (discussing how anyone with
a computer and modem can download vast quantities of perfect software).
106. See supra text accompanying note 95 (noting that illegal copying is an
extremely common behavior).
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transforming works of authorship undermine the assumptions
implicit in conventional copyright law. Nevertheless, copyright
serves too vital a function in our society to be casually dismissed.
As a stimulus to the creative process, authors must retain the
legal right to benefit from their labors.
The crux of the problem is that legal sanctions, civil or
criminal, operate only against those parties whom law enforce-
ment can catch. 107 Sysops and other large-scale infringers are
uniquely vulnerable to law enforcement. 08 Nevertheless, in a
world where the average person can quickly and easily make
perfect reproductions of copyrighted works, software makers
cannot depend on law enforcement or legal remedies for succor.
Copyright will always exist, but in the future, its parameters
will be redefined.
In order to win the war on software piracy in the coming
years, software makers must employ technological copy
protections to deter the average user, and reserve civil actions
for use against large-scale infringers. Unlike criminal sanctions,
a combination of technological copy protections and civil
penalties will deter the average computer user as well as large-
scale infringers. This dual approach is therefore the best option
in the war on software piracy.
Civil suits are preferable to criminal trials for a variety of
reasons. Unlike the overburdened criminal justice system,'0 9
software makers have the resources and expertise to vigorously
and effectively litigate against infringers."0 The prospect of a
financially devastating civil suit is therefore more likely to deter
illegal copying than empty threats of criminal liability. This is
especially true in the international arena. Foreign infringers,
who have little to fear from U.S. criminal laws, have not escaped
107. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90 (asserting that it is virtually
impossible to apprehend endusers).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73 (stating that sysops are low-
hanging fruit from a law enforcement perspective).
109. Internet Security 1994: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Science of the
House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 92-93
(1994) (statement of Thomas T. Kubic on behalf of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation). The F.B.I.'s white collar crime unit attends to 75,000 cases a
year, 190 of which relate to computer crime. Id.
110. See infra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing the software
industry's anti-piracy activities).
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costly litigation with U.S. software makers."'
Furthermore, civil awards provide injured copyright holders
with tangible monetary benefits. Software copyright holders
have already won millions of dollars in civil suits against
software pirates. 112 On the other hand, it is hard to see how
they have benefitted from the criminal prosecution of individuals
like David LaMacchia. Even a successful prosecution of a sysop
would be of largely symbolic value, since it would not reduce the
gross incidence of illegal copying.13
Finally, the civil copyright statute is more flexible than its
criminal counterpart. Since civil infringement includes noncom-
mercial copying, software makers can use the civil statute
against noncommercial infringers like David LaMacchia."4
Furthermore, the burden of proof for civil infringement is fairly
low. Software makers can establish a prima facie case of
software piracy simply by establishing ownership of a copyright
and copying by the defendant. The benefits of civil awards are
far more material and realistic than anything criminal sanctions
can offer.
Software makers will lose little by embracing civil and
private remedies. Skyrocketing losses from piracy show that
criminal copyright laws have little utility in the digital era. In
general, the realities of digital authorship suggest that addi-
tional regulations are unnecessary and unworkable. Taken in
that context, the result in LaMacchia does not suggest a
deficiency in the laws, but only a deficiency in the regulatory
powers of government. The real lesson of LaMacchia is that in
cyberspace, criminal copyright laws serve a symbolic, rather
than regulatory, function.
C. A NEW ERA OF CORPORATE ACTIVISM
An obvious criticism of this delimited model of copyright law
is that civil remedies alone will not sufficiently protect software
111. In fact, copyright litigation is no longer a wholly defensive tool. After
Texas Instruments won $700 million from Japanese and Korean companies,
software makers have begun to think of litigation as a way to increase profits.
Faye Rice, How Copycats Steal Billions, FORTUNE, Apr. 22, 1991, at 157, 164.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (discussing the multiple
sources of illegal copying).
114. LaMacchia's behavior may have been aberrational. But see supra note
72 and accompanying text (discussing Daniel Goldwater's arrest for noncommer-
cial copying).
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makers. Even with the current array of civil remedies, the
dollar value of pirated software equals 35% to 52% of total
legitimate software sales in the United States."5 Internation-
ally, the figures are even higher."6 Software copyrights do
need protecting, but the software industry cannot realistically
expect legal remedies alone to completely eradicate illegal
copying.
Fundamentally, policy makers and software makers need to
accept that common marketing techniques invite piracy. Disks
without copy protection are too easy to copy and unprotected
netware is too easy to download. Conceivably, legal sanctions
could decrease the number of pirate boards on the Internet.
Nevertheless, legal remedies will not decrease the gross
incidence of illegal copying because they do nothing to address
the ease with which software is reproduced. Illegal copying will
persist as long as software makers market programs that are
easy to copy. Technological copy protections are an attractive
solution because they do not rely on a theoretical deterrent
effect; they simply eliminate the threat of copying.
New technology has made older forms of copy protection
more effective. Because old copy protection consisted of protec-
tive code embedded on the program disk itself, hackers could
decode the copy protection and reproduce the software in intact,
usable form."7  In recent years, software makers have pre-
vented illegal copying by including a "key" with each copy of
software sold."' The key plugs into the parallel printer port
115. The Business Software Alliance estimates that illegal software accounts
for 35% of legitimate sales. Jon Choy, Review of Japanese Copyright Laws
Revives American Concerns, JEI REP., Nov. 19, 1993, available in WESTLAW,
Allnews Database. The SPA estimates that illegal software accounts for about
52% of legitimate sales. Wendy Hower, Software Cops TakingAim at Corporate
Copycats, BOSTON Bus. J., Dec. 23, 1991, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus
Database.
116. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 48, at 62; see also Eric Ehrmann, Another
Giant Sucking Sound: Lost Royalties, Licensing Fees, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 2, 1993, at 5 (discussing foreign markets for pirated U.S. software).
117. Susan Gelfond, Taking the Swagger Out of Software Pirates, Bus.
WEEK, Oct. 19, 1987, at 96G, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database.
118. See Mark S. Basham, Spotlight Recommendation: Rainbow Technolo-
gies, EMERGING & SPECIAL SITUATIONS, July 17, 1992, at 9 (advising investors
to buy shares in Rainbow Technologies, the manufacturer of a popular copy
protection mechanism); Eric Schine, Rainbow Technologies' Price Rises as
Software Anti-Piracy Device Catches On, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1988, available in
WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database (discussing the financial success of the
copyright protection maker, and the popularity of its product).
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of a computer, and uses algorithms and encryption techniques to
control the program's execution." 9 The key's main conceptual
innovation is to split computer programs into separate but
interdependent physical components. Hackers might be able to
decode a floppy disk but without the key they will be left with an
incomplete and therefore unusable program. Copying the
contents of a decoded disk is pointless because the copied
software will not operate without the key.
Critics of copy protection schemes argue technological
safeguards will not provide adequate protections because skilled
hackers can eventually break down even the most sophisticated
technological defenses. 20 This argument is flawed, however,
because it erroneously confines the threat of illegal copying to a
small group of highly sophisticated computer experts. The fact
is, losses from software piracy have reached such huge figures
because nearly all computer users copy illegally.'2' Technolo-
gical protections may not deter an M.I.T. computer engineer, but
they do deter the largest and therefore most dangerous source
of illegal copying, the average user. Consumer dissatisfaction
with earlier, more primitive copy protection measures was so
widespread that the software industry abandoned copy protec-
tion en masse. 2 That fact alone attests to the efficacy of
technological protections. Furthermore, since modern copy
protection schemes allow users to make archival copies, software
119. Schine, supra note 118.
120. Most copy protection methods consisted of encoded commands, placed
on the floppy disks themselves. See James Bates, High-Tech Piracy Dispute
Points Up Copying Controversy, L.-A TIMES, June 24, 1986, available in
WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database (discussing copy protection codes); cf
Gelfond supra note 117 (noting pirates routinely broke copy protection codes
and went on to sell bootlegged copies); Choy, supra note 115 (describing how
some programmers devised and marketed utility programs that circumvent
embedded copy-protection schemes).
121. See O'Shei, supra note 76, at 23 (asserting that nearly all computer
users copy illegally).
122. The software industry has experimented with technological protections
in the past. In the 1980s, the computer industry sought ways to protect its
floppy disks from illegal copying. Legitimate purchasers objected to copy
protection because it prevented them from making back-up copies. The industry
bowed to consumer pressure and abandoned copy protection as a viable means
of prevention. There is a peculiar irony here: widespread consumer dissatisfac-
tion with copy protection attests to its utility as an anti-piracy measure. In
fact, recent technological advances and continuing losses from piracy have led
software makers to reconsider copy protection as a means of preventing
infringement. Jonathan Chevreau, SoftCop Tackles the Software Pirates, FIN.
POST, Mar. 12, 1994, available in WESTIAW, Allnewsplus Database.
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makers can adopt technological protections without fear of
consumer reprisal.
Credible alternatives to criminal liability do exist. Techno-
logical safeguards prevent copying in the first instance. 123
Flexible licensing schemes allow purchasers to customize
payments, thus reducing incentives to cheat." Corporate
activism by software manufacturers serves a deterrent role.us
123. SoftCop, Inc. has marketed another solution to illegal copying. This
scheme uses code to "thumbprint" individual programs to a user's computer.
Copied programs will not run on another computer without authorization, but
the thumbprint allows users to make backup copies and will not prevent
archival disks from operating on a licensed user's computer. This scheme
incorporates a unique marketing ploy. Should unauthorized users attempt to
use an illegal copy, they will find the program unusable until it is activated.
Activation is free for a trial period, after which the user has the option to
purchase the software. The thumbprint scheme is attractive to software makers
because it allows users to make backup copies. The primary limitation of the
thumbprint is that it leaves an intact program embedded onto a single floppy
disk. A skilled user could therefore break the code and manufacture usable
copies. Id.
Another technological protection scheme is similar to a lease arrangement.
Essentially, this type of software is designed to "expire" after a certain
time-usually six months. Before the expiration, the software maker mails
diskettes that reactivate the software for another six months. If new versions
of the software come out, the user can pay for an upgrade. This scheme does
not prevent illegal copying, but because copies will only be usable for a short
time it removes much of the incentive to copy. Like the thumbprint, this
scheme leaves an intact program embedded on a single floppy disk. A skilled
user could conceivably break the code and manufacture usable copies. Dan
Gilimor, Piracy War Could Kill Software Maker, OTTAwA CITIZEN, Oct. 12, 1994,
available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database.
124. A generalized means of controlling piracy is through scalable licensing
schemes for corporate software purchasers. These schemes consist of one initial
license and add-on modules priced per user. Lotus has enhanced this scheme
by requiring the signature of a corporate representative on the licensing
agreement for its Lotus Notes software. Hower, supra note 115. The license is
not valid until a corporate representative signs the licensing agreement. Kevin
Brown, director of services marketing for Corporate Software, said that, "Lotus'
ploy is to shore up this piracy issue by making these things deliberate." Id. By
requiring the purchaser to read and agree to the terms of the licensing
agreement, Lotus ensures that software purchasers will be held accountable for
illegal copying. Scalable licensing schemes are attractive because customers
buy what they need, the software vendor gets the appropriate amount of
revenue, and the distributor does not have to speculate about demand for
various software.
125. Software makers can back up copy protection and licensing schemes by
employing corporate activism and civil litigation. Industry groups like the
Software Publishers Association and the Business Software Alliance, and
individual corporations have been instrumental in combating software piracy.
See Gelfond, supra note 117 (noting a California software developer has nabbed
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Each of these tactics decrease piracy without requiring govern-
mental intervention. By using copy protection against endusers
and civil suits against sysops, software makers can attack
software piracy at every level. The war on software piracy
cannot be won unless those tactics are employed.' 26
CONCLUSION
The situation in United States v. LaMacchia represents the
confluence of important social and technological trends. As the
population of cyberspace grows, the influence of digital technolo-
gies will increase. Policy makers will need to rearticulate the
laws as they apply to the electronic dimension. In particular,
policy makers will need to rearticulate the copyright laws as
four international piracy operations); Informix Installs Confidential Sneak-Line
to Collect Intelligence on Piracy, Computergram Intl Apt Data Service Ltd., Oct.
22, 1992, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database (describing Informix'
efforts to quell the piracy of its software).
Software interests monitor pirate bulletin boards and sponsor toll free "tip
lines" for anyone wishing to give information about illegal copying. See SPA
Reveals Increase in Cybercrime, COMPUTER FRAUD & SEC. BULL., Feb. 1, 1995,
available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database; see also Hower, supra note 115
(asserting that most of SPA's phone tips are from disgruntled employees who
seek revenge against their employers).
Software groups also give educational seminars to software purchasers who
may not be aware of what constitutes illegal copying. Choy, supra note 115
(describing BSA educational campaigns aimed at Japanese executives and
administrators); cf. O'Shei, supra note 76, at 23 (discussing common misconcep-
tions about what constitutes piracy, and software makers' attempts to correct
them).
Software makers can muster more effective police efforts than the
government because they are not constrained by the same procedural
requirements, and because they have the resources, expertise, and incentive
to diligently pursue their interests. Monitoring of bulletin boards, tip line
investigations, and impromptu, warrantless audits have already extracted
millions of dollars in penalties from copyright infringers.
126. Software makers have had to employ copy protection, scalable licensing,
corporate activism, and civil litigation as anti-piracy measures because the
threat of criminal liability has not and cannot decrease illegal copying. The
government's inability to police effectively cyberspace is salt in the wounds of
an industry that loses billions of dollars to piracy, despite its own efforts to
deter illegal copying. Nevertheless, self-help's imperfect protections are far
superior to any current or prospective statutory device at the government's
disposal. Furthermore, software makers must realize that the existing battery
of private remedies can be substantially improved, particularly with regard to
technological safeguards. As long as programs are easy to copy, software piracy
will continue to plague the industry. Employing copy protection devices like the
"software key" is the most-perhaps the only-effective means to deter illegal
copying.
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they apply to software.
This Note asserts the imposition of criminal sanctions for
noncommercial copyright infringement is unnecessary, undesir-
able, and unworkable in the online world. To deter piracy,
software makers should selectively apply civil and private
actions, and employ technology to eliminate the threat of
enduser copying. By attacking endusers and sysops together,
software makers can reduce greatly the gross incidence of illegal
copying.
